Complete list of journal articles
Below please find my complete list of journal publications in reverse chronological order. If you have problems obtaining a particular paper, please let me know (at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it ), and I will gladly send you the relevant item by air-mail. Due to copyright reasons, I cannot e-mail pdf files of published papers. The links will work for those with electronic subscription to the relevant journals.
Estimated Interest Rate Rules: Do they Determine Determinacy Properties? The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics: Vol. 11: Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 11 (2011).
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in a Micro-founded Model of a Monetary Union (w. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma), Journal of International Economics 67 (2005), 320-352.
Mark-up Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy Stabilization in a Monetary Union (w. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma). Journal of Macroeconomics 26 (2004), 357-376.
Contingent Deficit Sanctions and Moral Hazard with a Stability Pact (w. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma). Journal of International Economics 61 (2003), 187-208.
Common Agency with Rational Expectations: Theory and Application to a Monetary Union (w. Avinash Dixit). Economic Journal 113 (2003), 539-549.
Structural Convergence under Reversible and Irreversible Monetary Unification (w. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma). Journal of International Money and Finance 22 (2003), 417-439.
Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: Comment (w. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma). Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 35 (2003), 129-136.
Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation? American Economic Review 92 (2002), 928-956.
Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104 (2002), 399-422.
To Peg or Not to Peg? A Simple Model of Exchange Rate Regime Choice in Small Economies (w. Helge Berger and Guttorm Schjelderup). Economics Letters 73 (2001), 161-167.
Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets. European Economic Review 44 (2000), 517-539.
Monetary Policy Cooperation and Multiple Equilibria. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 23 (1999), 1133-1153.
Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment (w. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma). American Economic Review 89 (1999), 342-347.
A Note on Discontinuous Value Functions and Strategies in Affine-Quadratic Differential Games (w. Ben Lockwood). Economics Letters 61 (1998), 301-306.
Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences (w. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma). Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 30 (1998), 384-403.
Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation. American Economic Review 87 (1997), 911-920.
Monetary Policy Cooperation May Not Be Counterproductive. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 99 (1997), 73-80.
The Advantage of International Fiscal Cooperation under Alternative Monetary Regimes. European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996), 485-504.
Note on 'Loss of Monetary Discretion in a Simple Dynamic Policy Game' (w. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma and A. Lans Bovenberg). Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 20 (1996), 1797-1800.
Sustaining Policy Cooperation between Economies of Different Size. Journal of International Economics 36 (1994), 289-307.
Loss of Monetary Discretion in a Simple Dynamic Policy Game. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 18 (1994), 763-779.
Efficient Bargaining and Accommodation Policies. Recherches Economiques de Louvain 59 (1993), 463-484.
International Monetary Policy Cooperation in Economies with Centralized Wage Setting. Open Economies Review 4 (1993), 269-285.
Rules, Discretion, and International Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination (w. Jay H. Bryson and David D. Van Hoose). Open Economies Review 4 (1993), 117-32.
Uncertainty in Interdependent Economies with Monopoly Unions. Journal of Macroeconomics 15 (1993), 1-24.
Time Inconsistency Problems and Commitments of Monetary and Fiscal Policies. Journal of Economics 56 (1992), 247-266.
|
|
|